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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—DEVICE SEARCHES
ABSENT REASONABLE SUSPICION ALLOW
SECURITY INTERESTS TO OUTWEIGH PRIVACY
CONCERNS AND AMPLIFY BIAS AT THE U.S.
BORDER—ALASAAD V. MAYORKAS, 988 F.3D 8
(1ST CIR. 2021)
The Constitution of the United States sets forth fundamental principles that create a national government, divide its power, and protect individual liberties.1 Although the Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable
searches and seizures, some searches, such as those conducted at the United
States border, are subject to exceptions.2 In Alasaad v. Mayorkas,3 the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered whether
searches of electronic devices at the border require a warrant.4 Elevating
security interests above privacy concerns, the First Circuit held that searches
of cellphones and electronic devices fall within the border exception to the

1
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 1.1, 1-4
(5th ed. 2015) (discussing Constitution’s functions).
2
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (establishing right to privacy against unreasonable searches and
seizures). The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.; see also Deborah Anthony, The U.S. Border Patrol’s Constitutional Erosion in the “100-Mile
Zone,” 124 PENN ST. L. REV. 391, 396 (2020) (stating different constitutional protections exist for
purposes of border security). At the border, “protections against governmental privacy incursions
are significantly reduced.” Anthony, supra, at 391 (outlining Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding Fourth Amendment protections and border security); see also Ralph Seep, What constitutes
functional equivalent of border for purpose of border exception to requirements of Fourth Amendment, 94 A.L.R. Fed. 372 § 2(a) (2021) (providing background for border search exception).
Historically, border searches have constituted an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
probable cause and warrant requirements. The Supreme Court has noted that border
searches from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment have been considered to be
‘reasonable’ by the single fact that the person or item in question has entered into the
country from outside.
Seep, supra.
3
988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2021).
4
See id. at 12-13 (providing overview of case).
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Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement when such searches are for the
purpose of locating contraband or evidence of contraband.5
From 2016 through 2019, at various United States ports of entry,
federal officers seized and searched the electronic devices of ten lawful citizens and one permanent resident (“Plaintiffs”).6 While some searches occurred at border crossings, most took place at United States airports as individuals returned from international flights.7 The searches included
smartphones, both locked and unlocked, along with other electronic devices
such as laptop computers.8 United States Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) officers searched the devices of five of the Plaintiffs more than
once, and CBP officers searched the devices of two female Plaintiffs despite
their religious objections to having the officers view photos of the women
without their headscarves.9 Information gleaned from the devices notably

5

See id. at 13 (holding basic and advanced searches at border are routine and do not require
reasonable suspicion); United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding manual
searches of electronic devices are reasonable without individualized suspicion); United States v.
Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018) (reiterating routine searches at border do not require
reasonable suspicion). The court went on to state that “the district court erroneously narrowed the
scope of permissible searches of such equipment at the border.” Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 13; see also
HILLEL SMITH & KELSEY SANTAMARIA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46601, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
AT THE BORDER AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 55 (2021), https://perma.cc/YNM8-XV3E (raising issue of “whether the Supreme Court’s reliance on ethnic appearance as a factor in borderrelated searches and seizures can still hold sway”). Given changing demographics, several courts
have looked to the Fourth Amendment to temper the government’s consideration of ethnicity and
race during border stops and detentions. See Smith, supra, at 55-56 (pointing to constitutional
challenges). In one case,
[A] federal district court considered a constitutional challenge to the detention of two
airline passengers that was based, in part, on their Arab ethnicity. . . . The court declared
that ethnicity “has no probative value in a particularized reasonable-suspicion or probable cause-determination” because it has no bearing on a person’s propensity to commit
a crime.
Id. at 56; Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting value of race
and ethnicity as factor for establishing reasonable suspicion).
6
See Alasaad v. Nielson, 419 F. Supp. 3d 142, 149 (D. Mass. 2019) (detailing relevant parties
to case); Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 13 (supplementing district court’s summary of facts).
7
See Alasaad, 419 F. Supp. at 149 (identifying where searches at issue occurred); see also
United States v. Molina-Gómez, 781 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding border search exception
applies to international airports). “International airports . . . are considered the ‘functional equivalent’ of an international border” and are therefore included in the border search exception. See
Molina-Gómez, 781 F.3d at 19.
8
See Alasaad, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (describing types of electronic devices searched). At
least three plaintiffs had other electronic devices such as a laptop searched. Id.
9
See id. at 149-50 (acknowledging unique circumstances of particular searches). Two of the
plaintiffs, Alasaad and Merchant, opposed having male officers view photos of them “without their
headscarves as required in public.” Id. at 149.
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included highly sensitive work-related materials and privileged attorney-client communications.10
The Plaintiffs filed suit against the heads of the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”), CBP, and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in their official capacities seeking declarative and
injunctive relief, arguing that agency policies concerning electronic devices
violated their constitutional rights.11 Plaintiffs first argued that under the
Fourth Amendment, the border search warrant exception does not extend to
the searches of electronic devices.12 As to their First Amendment claim, the
Plaintiffs alleged that searches of electronic devices without a warrant or
reasonable suspicion may chill free speech and interfere with their freedoms
related to association and the press.13 The United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgement in favor of the
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims, concluding that the CBP and ICE policies violated the Fourth Amendment because basic and advanced searches
are non-routine searches that require reasonable suspicion.14 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the border
search exception to the warrant requirement “encompassed basic, routine

10
See id. at 150 (offering additional examples of searches’ content). One plaintiff’s phone
stored information pertaining to his work as a journalist. Id. Another plaintiff’s phone was “a work
phone officially owned by NASA” and contained work-related information. Id. A third plaintiff
declined to give consent to a search of her phone because it contained attorney-client communications, however, officers proceeded to search her device. Id.
11
See Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 14-15 (summarizing plaintiffs’ claims). The plaintiffs alleged that
the nature of the searches conducted by CBP and ICE violated their Fourth and First Amendment
rights. Id. at 14.
12
See id. at 17 (outlining plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims). The plaintiffs reasoned that
the purpose of border search warrant exceptions is limited to “interdicting contraband and preventing the entry of inadmissible persons.” Id. Therefore, expanding the exception to include searches
of electronic devices was overly broad and “[does] little to advance the underlying purposes of the
border search exception . . . .” Id.
13
See id. at 21-22 (reasoning warrantless and searches without suspicion threaten sensitive
and personal data). The plaintiffs additionally argued that the searches could interfere with their
freedom to associate without government scrutiny. Id.
14
See Alasaad, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 163, 165, 168 (noting breadth of both basic and advanced
searches make them non-routine); Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 15 (reviewing procedural posture of case).
According to CBP and ICE policies, “a basic search and advanced search differ only in the equipment used to perform the search and certain types of data that may be accessed with that equipment,
but otherwise both implicate the same privacy concerns.” Alasaad, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 163 (emphasis added). Basic searches encompass content that is “physically resident” on electronic devices, while advanced searches allow officers to examine deleted and encrypted files as well as
employ additional equipment, techniques, and procedures to copy the uncovered information. Id.
at 163, 165.
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searches of cellphones and electronic devices without reasonable suspicion.”15
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes several exceptions to
the warrant requirement.16 To determine whether a search is exempt from
the warrant requirement, courts assess the level of intrusion upon an individual’s privacy and the government’s need to serve a legitimate government
interest.17 Rooted in the government’s “inherent authority to protect,” the
border search exception allows for routine searches at the border without a
warrant or probable cause.18 Prior to Congress’ proposal of the Fourth
Amendment, Congress implemented the first customs statute, the Act of July
31, 1789, which granted officials the authority to search ships and vessels
suspected of concealing goods subject to duty.19 Because “[a] port of entry
is not a traveler’s home[,]” individuals had a lessened expectation of privacy,
permitting border searches to enforce duty collection and obtain contraband

15

See Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 19-20 (holding electronic device searches at border do not require
reasonable suspicion). The court agreed with the holdings of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits that
“basic border searches” of electronic devices are routine and therefore do not impose the requirement of reasonable suspicion. Id.
16
See George C. Thomas III, Stumbling Toward History: The Framers’ Search and Seizure
World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 199, 202 (noting Supreme Court’s early recognition of particular
exceptions to warrant requirement). Likewise, searches at the border are long recognized as necessary procedures; exemplified by an 1863 act that authorized examination of ships, vessels, and
persons to find prohibited goods. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622-23 (1886); see also
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (noting travelers may be stopped at international boundaries to identify themselves and their belongings).
17
See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (comparing warrant exception to context
of lawful arrests). “Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, . . . [s]uch a balancing of
interests supported the search incident to arrest exception.” Id. at 385-86 (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
18
See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004) (emphasizing territorial
protection is unquestionable and paramount government interest); United States v. Momoh, 427
F.3d 137, 143 (2005) (stating border search exception allows for routine searches of persons and
effects without probable cause); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1997) (reaffirming
reasonable border searches do not require existence of probable cause); see also Chloe Meade,
Note, The Border Search Exception in the Modern Era: An Exploration of Tensions Between Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Circuits, 26 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 189, 195 (2020) (recognizing
heightened powers of government at border). Throughout history, “both Congress and the courts
have justified and expanded the border search exception[,]” to evolve from a method of “generating
revenue and policing goods[,]” into a “tool necessary to protect U.S. national security interests and
prevent unwanted persons from entering the U.S.” Meade, supra, at 195.
19
See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1595 (originally enacted as Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29,
43) (establishing authority for warrantless searches for illegal goods by custom officials at checkpoints); Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616 (explaining historical background of border search exception).
The Act notably distinguished searches at the border from searches in homes, buildings, or other
private dwelling places within the country. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616 (differentiating border
searches from those under more private circumstances).
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without a warrant or probable cause.20 As Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
evolved, the Supreme Court applied the border search exception’s rationale—that the government’s national security interest outweighs an individual’s expectation of privacy at the border—to modern counterparts, eventually leading lower courts to examine its application to electronic devices.21
The scope of routine and non-routine searches, of which the latter
requires reasonable suspicion, is dependent on the degree of invasiveness or
intrusiveness of the search and is particular to the facts of a case.22 However,
the Supreme Court impliedly limited the distinction between routine and
non-routine searches to those of persons and not property.23 While courts
consider the objective intrusiveness of a search, efforts to strike a balance
between national security and privacy concerns frequently favor the government’s goal of preventing unwanted individuals and items from entering the
country.24
The digital age quickly complicated the reasonableness of border
searches, with millions of individuals traveling each day with electronic

20
See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 (quoting United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S.
363, 376 (1971)) (noting long-standing rationale for border exception); see also Flores-Montano,
541 U.S. at 153-55 (accounting for congressional intent with respect to customs officials).
21
See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154 (explaining nation’s self-protection interest reasonably requires
conducting automobile searches at U.S. border); Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 614-15, 624-25 (upholding
constitutionality of search of envelopes suspected to contain contraband that arrived from Thailand); see also United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 503 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding border search
exception gave officials authority to search video camera for contraband); United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (D. Md. 2014) (requiring reasonable suspicion for searches of digital
device’s imaged hard drives).
22
See United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1988) (listing factors used to determine whether search is routine). Factors to consider include:

(i) whether the search results in the exposure of intimate body parts or requires the suspect to disrobe; (ii) whether physical contact between Customs officials and the suspect
occurs during the search; (iii) whether force is used to effect the search; (iv) whether the
type of search exposes the suspect to pain or danger; (v) the overall manner in which the
search is conducted; and (vi) whether the suspect’s reasonable expectations of privacy,
if any, are abrogated by the search.
Id. Subjecting individuals to strip searches or body-cavity searches are examples of non-routine
searches, whereas asking a female to lift her skirt was considered routine. Id. at 512-13 (contrasting
factual circumstances of searches); see also United States v. Molina-Gómez, 781 F.3d 13, 19 (1st
Cir. 2015) (requiring reasonable suspicion for non-routine searches).
23
See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (suggesting distinction between searches should be
reserved to searches of individuals). “Complex balancing tests to determine what is a ‘routine’
search of a vehicle, as opposed to a more ‘intrusive’ search of a person, have no place in border
searches of vehicles.” Id.
24
See id. (stating border exception, while not limitless, recognizes reduced right to privacy at
border); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1985) (taking
account of search’s nature to favor government interests).
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devices which contain ranges of sensitive and private information.25 When
examining the constitutionality of a warrantless search of a cellphone incident to a lawful arrest, the Supreme Court acknowledged the unique privacy
concerns regarding the search and seizure of information stored in electronic
devices.26 Courts across the circuits have agreed that searches of electronic
devices are incomparable to physical items or persons due to the vast amount
of accessible information that such devices contain.27 However, the Supreme
Court has declined to “either create or suggest a categorical rule to the effect
that the government must always secure a warrant before accessing the contents of such a device.”28 Despite continued technological advancements increasing the government’s reach into private data, the Supreme Court has not
explicitly addressed the scope of advantaged electronics border searches.29
Due to the absence of Supreme Court precedent, the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits are split on

25

See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing border search
exception’s scope and privacy rights involving electronic devices). “But while technology may
have changed the expectation of privacy to some degree, it has not eviscerated it, and certainly not
with respect to the gigabytes of data regularly maintained as private and confidential on digital
devices.” Id.
26
See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (stating modern electronic devices “implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or
a purse”). The Court further differentiated electronics “in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense
from other objects that might be kept on [a traveler’s] person.” Id. (distinguishing electronic devices); see also Rebecca Rowland, Note, Border Searches of Electronic Devices, 97 WASH. U. L.
REV. 545, 559 (2019) (discussing pervasiveness of electronic devices and the frequency with which
they accompany travelers to the border); Taylor Hatmaker, Trump Administration Sued Over Warrantless Smartphone Searches at US borders, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 13, 2017, 3:02 PM),
https://perma.cc/JF5K-XUAP (“Our electronic devices contain massive amounts of information
that can paint a detailed picture of our personal lives, including emails, texts, contact lists, photos,
work documents, and medical or financial records.”)
27
See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 964 (noting “[e]lectronic devices are capable of storing warehouses full of information”); see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 393 (distinguishing search of cell phones
from traditionally searched belongings). “The United States asserts that a search of all data stored
on a cell phone is ‘materially indistinguishable’ from searches of these sorts of physical items. That
is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.” Riley,
573 U.S. at 393.
28
See United States v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2020) (explaining Supreme
Court precedent only cautioned application of private search doctrine to electronic devices). The
First Circuit determined the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Riley could not be applied to the facts
of the case because “a government inspection of evidence that falls within the ambit of the private
search doctrine does not constitute a search in the first place[.]” Id.
29
See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 965 (“With access to the cloud through forensic examination, a
traveler’s cache is just a click away from the government.”) The “cloud” allows a user’s data to be
held on remote servers as opposed to being on the device itself. Id.; see also United States v.
Molina-Isidoro, 884 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting absence of post-Riley Supreme Court
decision requiring warrant for electronic device search).
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the level of suspicion required for border searches of electronic devices.30
Specifically, the circuits differ on whether the warrant requirement for cellphone searches applies to forensic searches of electronic devices at the border.31 The Fourth and Ninth Circuits agree that officers must possess some
level of individualized suspicion of criminal activity to perform a search absent a warrant or probable cause.32 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit held that
border searches of electronic devices may be performed by officers without
reasonable suspicion.33
At the border, CBP and ICE enforce a broad spectrum of laws, and
both agencies’ policies provide nearly-identical “standard procedures” for
searches of electronic devices to ensure compliance with customs, immigration, and other regulations.34 CBP policy specifically demands that officers
do not take race or ethnicity into account with border investigation, screening, and law enforcement.35 However, a number of suits filed against border
30
See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144 (4th Cir. 2018) (outlining precedent holding
forensic searches of electronic devices require individualized level of suspicion); see also Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 957 (concluding reasonable suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices
at border required under circumstances). But see United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1229
(11th Cir. 2018) (holding no suspicion required to search electronic devices at border).
31
See Darianne De Leon, Comment, What Matters More: Preserving a Fundamental Right to
Privacy or Tampering with Another’s Dignity Through Searches Because of “Reasonable Suspicion,” 27 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 553, 555 (2019) (noting circuit split determining
level of suspicion required for lawful search at border).
32
See United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 719 n.4 (4th Cir. 2019) (allowing officers to
conduct searches of cellphones at border with reasonable suspicion); see also Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at
146-47 (concluding search of electronic device constituted non-routine border search requiring reasonable suspicion); United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding “manual
searches of cell phones at the border are reasonable without individualized suspicion”).
33
See United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding Riley did
not change rule to requiring only reasonable suspicion); Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233 (“The Supreme
Court has never required reasonable suspicion for a search of property at the border, however nonroutine and intrusive, and neither have we”). The First Circuit, however, declined to differentiate
between a laptop and cellphone, finding reasonable suspicion existed regardless of whether the
search was routine. United States v. Molina-Gómez, 781 F.3d 13, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2015). “We need
not categorize the search as either routine or non-routine because we agree with the government
that even assuming the search was non-routine, reasonable suspicion existed to justify the search.”
Id.
34
See 6 U.S.C. § 211(c)(5) (listing duty to “detect, respond to, and interdict . . . persons who
may undermine the security of the United States”); see also CBP Directive No. 3340-049A, Border
Search of Electronic Devices (Jan. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/495W-EBWN (outlining appropriate
procedure for device searches at border); Immigration and Customs Enforcement Directive No. 76.1, Border Searches of Electronic Devices (Jan. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/763C-E4AH (providing
legal guidance and establishing policy for border search authority). Regardless of whether a search
is basic or advanced, officers are authorized to search “information that is resident upon the [electronic] device.” CBP Directive No. 3340-049A, supra.
35
See CBP Policy on Nondiscrimination in Law Enforcement Activities and all other Administered Programs, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/F76RUDJQ (prohibiting consideration of race or ethnicity for almost all CBP activities). CBP further
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patrol agencies alleged discriminatory enforcement against people of color.36
Documented racial profiling confirms that certain racial and religious groups
face an increased likelihood of being searched at border stops.37 For example, CBP arrest records from bus terminals and railway stations in Rochester,
New York, reveal that out of 2,776 arrests over four years, only 0.9%

insists the agency “is fully committed to the fair, impartial and respectful treatment of all members
of the trade and traveling public.” Id. The DHS similarly implemented a policy that prohibits the
use of race or ethnicity under all but extraordinary circumstances. Smith & Santamaria, supra note
5, at 56-57.
According to the agency, immigration officers may consider race or ethnicity only when
there is a “compelling governmental interest” present, and the officers exercise their authority “in a way narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest.” The agency’s policy does not preclude consideration of race or ethnicity if that information is “specific to
particular suspects or incidents” (e.g., to identify a suspect).
Id. at 57. But see Hugh Handeyside et al., We Got U.S. Border Officials to Testify Under Oath.
Here’s What We Found Out, ACLU (Apr. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/6CWB-K8WA (suggesting
border officials’ behavior does not align with alleged commitment to fairness, equality, and impartiality).
36
See Chris Rickerd, A Dangerous Precedent: Why Allow Racial Profiling at or Near the
Border?, ACLU (Dec. 8, 2014), https://perma.cc/ZW7Z-MRHV (asserting CBP’s “horrible track
record of discriminatory enforcement against people of color”); Ahad Khilji, Comment, Warrantless Searches of Electronic Devices at U.S. Borders: Securing The Nation or Violating Digital
Liberty?, 27 CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 173, 201 (2019) (contending people of color targeted by CBP
agents); see also Memorandum in Support of Defendant at 1, Owunna v. United States, 2018 WL
3342773 (E.D. Va. May 3, 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-00536-LMB-MSN) (noting plaintiff’s claim of improper detainment and device search by CBP); Millan-Hernandez v. Barr, 965 F.3d 140, 149 (2d
Cir. 2020) (exemplifying case where evidence suggested racial considerations led to border search).
Millan-Hernandez exposed a CBP supervisor’s racial slurs towards Latinos, and an anonymous
ICE official stated that there is a “very specific clientele that [they] look for.” 965 F.3d at 149.
After stopping the vehicle Millan-Hernandez was a passenger in for a potential traffic violation and
learning that the driver had a foreign passport, an officer demanded that all passengers provide their
papers. Id. at 148.
37
See Anthony, supra note 2, at 403 (pointing to reports suggesting only non-white passengers
subjected to border searches). Evidence also suggests that at one CBP checkpoint, “Latinos were
twenty times more likely to be detained than non-Latinos.” Id. at 402. Another report conducted
by the ACLU revealed that 85% of individuals apprehended in Michigan between 2012 and 2018
were from Latin America. Joe Davidson, Black Officers Say CBP Forced Them to Profile. A Study
in One State Backs Them Up., WASH. POST (July 22, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/9BYPH6LT (noting being person of color key reason for border control stop); see also Anna Kaplan,
Border Agents Caught Engaging With Violent Facebook Posts Given Lighter Punishment Than
Recommended, House Report Says, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2021, 2:00 PM), https://perma.cc/PG7Y6E7B (reporting on border officials’ participation in discriminatory social media activity investigation). The report’s findings revealed CBP agents engaged in “misconduct including degrading
and threatening comments about migrants,” as members of private Facebook groups. Kaplan, supra note 37. Beyond traditional checkpoints, CBP and ICE officers have searched and detained
these groups at bus terminals, railway stations, and traffic stops within the United States’ borders.
Anthony, supra note 2, at 400-02. “In addition to its regular operations at the border and ports of
entry, CBP operates approximately 32 permanent ‘interior border checkpoints’ throughout the
country, along with another 39 temporary internal or ‘tactical’ checkpoints.” Id. at 400.
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involved individuals with a “fair complexion.”38 Thus, people of color with
privacy concerns that are already weakened by security interests are also disproportionately subjected to searches of their electronic devices.39
In Alasaad v. Mayorkas, the First Circuit addressed whether the border exception allows agents to perform basic searches of electronic devices
without reasonable suspicion.40 After affirming that border searches do not
require a warrant, the court focused on the “novel and significant” privacy
concerns surrounding electronic devices.41 Despite such considerations, the
court determined that government interests, which are paramount at the border, outweigh individual privacy concerns.42 Further, because there is no
“intrusive search of a person” when examining an electronic device, the court
held basic border searches of electronic devices are routine and do not require reasonable suspicion.43 The court credited the border agencies’ guidance, which only permits a manual search of a traveler’s electronic device
and prohibits any investigation beyond “data resident on the device,” stating
that such policies restrict the scope of private information accessible by an
agent and counter concerns regarding deleted or encrypted files that may be
especially sensitive.44 In accordance with previous Ninth and Eleventh

38
See Anthony, supra note 2, at 402-03 (providing statistical evidence of racial profiling at
border checkpoints).
39
See Khilji, supra note 36, at 203 (highlighting increased number of Muslim travelers’ devices being searched); see also United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (“The
Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the
international border.”); Florida v. Bostwick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991) (ruling individuals can
lower level of intrusion by choosing what they travel with).
40
See Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2021) (allowing routine searches of
electronic devices at border absent reasonable suspicion of contraband).
41
See id. at 18 (discussing privacy concerns surrounding modern implications of electronic
devices). To defend their argument that border searches of electronic devices are non-routine, the
plaintiffs contended that electronic devices “may contain a trove of sensitive personal information.
Id.; see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (emphasizing privacy concerns’ unique
nature); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (acknowledging impact of technological
advancement).
42
See Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 18 (recognizing superiority of government interests); see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 393 (distinguishing electronic devices searches information quantity and quality).
While both Alasaad and Riley involved the search of electronic devices, the court noted that “[t]he
search incident to arrest warrant exception is premised on protecting officers and preventing evidence destruction, rather than on addressing border crime.” Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 17 (differentiating
circumstances of two cases); Riley, 573 U.S. at 384-86 (outlining exception’s priorities).
43
See Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 18 (determining border searches of electronic devices considered
routine); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n.4 (1985) (providing
non-routine search example). Some non-routine searches include strip, body-cavity, and involuntary x-ray searches. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at n.4.
44
See Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 18-19 (detailing scope of routine electronic device search and limitations imposed by CBP policy); see also CBP Directive No. 3340-049A, supra note 34 (establishing guidelines for basic border searches of electronic devices).
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Circuit rulings, the court concluded that basic border searches of electronic
devices may be conducted without reasonable suspicion.45
The First Circuit also rejected arguments that the border search exception: (1) only extends to searches aimed at preventing the entry of contraband and inadmissible persons; and (2) only includes searches for illegal
contraband itself.46 The court explained that compared to non-border contexts, the scope of warrantless searches at the border “must be limited . . . to
that which is justified by the particular purposes served by the exception.”47
Because the government’s primary intention is to prevent crime at international borders, the court reasoned that searches for evidence of contraband
or crime align with that fundamental objective.48 With respect to the scope
of advanced searches, the court suggested that constitutional limitations do
not prevent Congress’s authorization of the inclusion of information or items
other than contraband.49 Additionally, the court dismissed the alleged distinction between evidence of contraband and contraband itself, concluding
that searches for evidence are critical to the government’s interest in controlling “who and what may enter the country.”50
While government interests at the border are undoubtedly important,
the Alasaad court failed to adequately address Fourth Amendment privacy
concerns related to the contents of electronic devices.51 In particular, the
court did not consider the impact of technological advancements discussed

45
See Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 18 (holding border search exception permits basic electronic device
searches without reasonable suspicion). “Every circuit that has faced this question has agreed that
Riley does not mandate a warrant requirement for border searches of electronic devices, whether
basic or advanced.” Id. at 17 (highlighting other circuit court decisions); see also United States v.
Vergara 884 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding border searches exempt from warrant
or probable cause requirement); United States. v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2019)
(holding basic and advanced border searches may be performed without warrant or probable cause).
46
See Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 19 (addressing scope of border search exception). In Alasaad, the
plaintiffs argued that the exception does not apply to searches for evidence of border-related crimes
or contraband. Id.
47
See id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)) (describing scope of search
exceptions).
48
See id. (proposing evidence of contraband or crime furthers government’s primary purpose).
The court also noted that the Supreme Court “has repeatedly said that routine searches ‘are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1997)).
49
See id. at 19-20 (doubting any congressional limitation on scope of border search exception).
The court goes on to state that “Congress is better situated than the judiciary to identify the harms
that threaten us at the border.” Id. at 20.
50
See id. at 20 (denying plaintiffs’ argument given fulfillment of government purpose); see
also Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620 (recognizing exception justified to allow government to control what
enters country); United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 721 (4th Cir. 2019) (including prevention of contraband introduction as basis for exception).
51
See Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 20 (characterizing electronic device search as unintrusive).
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by other circuits.52 The Fourth Amendment guarantees people the right to
be secure in their “papers,” which arguably includes the breadth of information stored on electronic devices.53 Electronic devices’ capacity to store
deleted or encrypted files and the development of cloud computing technology demonstrate the unique and expansive nature of digitally accessible data
that warrants certain constitutional protections.54 Further, the contents stored
on electronic devices are starkly different from the contents “traditionally
circumscribed by the size of [a] traveler’s luggage or automobile,” for which
the border exception was originally conceived.55 Consequently, “technology
matters,” and the scope of discoverable information on electronic devices
warrants a heightened expectation of privacy because the search is considerably more intrusive than that of traditional property in a non-routine investigation.56
While the court emphasized the government’s heightened security
interests, it was reluctant to thoroughly discuss the reasonableness of
searches conducted at the border and suggested that Congress and the Executive Branch are better equipped to evaluate potential harms.57 A careful
52

See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing nature of
electronic devices renders an attendant privacy expectation). This stance “stands in stark contrast
to the generic and impersonal” items. Id.
53
See id. (“[electronic devices] contain the most intimate details of our [travelers] lives: financial records, confidential business documents, medical records and private emails.”) The court
further stated that the nature of these materials implicates the constitutional protections of the
Fourth Amendment providing people the right to be secure in their “papers.” Id.; see also U.S.
CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing right of people to be secure in their papers).
54
See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 965 (explaining extent of technological advancement).
In the “cloud,” a user’s data, including the same kind of highly sensitive data one would
have in “papers” at home, is held on remote servers rather than on the device itself. The
digital device is a conduit to retrieving information from the cloud, akin to the key to a
safe deposit box. Notably, although the virtual “safe deposit box” does not itself cross
the border, it may appear as a seamless part of the digital device when presented at the
border.
Id.
55

See id. at 964 (recognizing evolving technologies have broadened government intrusion capabilities); Rowland, supra note 26, at 545 (“The border search exception originally was designed
to allow border agents to search travelers’ luggage for contraband and other harmful materials.
However, with the progress of technology, the border search exception is now being exploited by
border agents to conduct forensic searches of travelers’ electronic devices.”) Advancements in
technology are also demonstrated by the fact that the number of searches of electronic devices is
increasing each year, with over 33,000 searches in 2018. Rowland, supra note 26, at 545.
56
See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966 (“Technology has the dual and conflicting capability to
decrease privacy and augment the expectation of privacy”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens
by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”)
57
See Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 19-20 (2021) (dismissing question of whether
searches for items other than contraband are reasonable); see also United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d
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examination of competing policy considerations reveals that the Fourth
Amendment, at its core, is a reflection of the founders’ concern with government intrusion on private thoughts and ideas, and such concerns should not
be ignored simply because one crosses a border.58 The modern-day traveler
cannot feasibly delete files or leave their electronic device at home to mitigate the government’s intrusion into their private affairs.59 Accordingly, implementing the requirement of reasonable suspicion of contraband, or evidence of contraband related to a traveler’s electronic device, could
effectively balance the government’s security interests with the individual’s
constitutional right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.60
A comprehensive exploration of reasonableness and the scope of
searches in this context should also examine the persistent issue of racial bias
at the border.61 Absent the requirement of a warrant or reasonable suspicion
for searches of electronic devices at the border, the harm to groups whose
Fourth Amendment rights are already weakened because they are disproportionately subjected to searches at the border will be amplified.62 Despite internal nondiscrimination guidance from the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), CBP, and ICE, courts continue to waver on whether race and
ethnicity can be considered a factor under the guise of “exceptional instances.”63 Aggressive travel and immigration policies targeting certain
133, 152 (4th Cir. 2018) (indicating continued uncertainty as to who should strike balance at border).
58
See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 964-65 (emphasizing importance of historical intent of Fourth
Amendment). But see Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 20 (asserting Congress and Executive branch can implement greater protection of electronic devices at border).
59
See Rowland, supra note 26, at 558 (“the only certain way to protect against forensic
searches of electronic devices at the border is to leave their devices at home entirely – a solution
which is impractical in the modern age.”) However, individuals increasingly rely on their electronic
devices and leaving them at home is impractical. Id.; see also Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 965
(“[R]emoving files unnecessary to an impending trip is an impractical solution given the volume
and often intermingled nature of the files.”) The court noted “it is also a time-consuming task that
may not even effectively erase the files.” Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 965.
60
See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (requiring “some level of
suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person”); see also Rowland, supra note 26,
at 572 (arguing lack of adequate protections makes reasonable suspicion standard imperative to
privacy interests). Manual searches and forensic searches implicate a similar level of sensitive
information, indicating that manual searches should involve a higher standard of reasonableness.
Rowland, supra note 26, at 570 (characterizing both searches as nonroutine).
61
See Rickerd, supra note 36 (citing evidence of racial profiling at various border stops).
62
See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (highlighting importance of government’s security
interests); Florida v. Bostwick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991) (suggesting individuals can counter
privacy concerns); see also Khilji, supra note 36, at 203 (describing increased number of Muslim
travelers’ devices being searched); Anthony, supra note 2, at 403 (discussing reports of disproportionate searches of certain groups).
63
See sources cited supra, note 35 (discussing agency commitment to impartial treatment of
all persons crossing border); see also Smith & Santamaria, supra note 5, at 55-57 (examining
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groups undermine these agencies’ efforts, and recent cases indicate the implementation of agency nondiscrimination standards alone are insufficient to
prevent officials from relying on race or ethnicity during border enforcement
activities.64 By reaffirming the dominance of government security interests,
the court enables and enhances the likelihood that persons belonging to particular racial and ethnic groups will be subject to searches without reasonable
suspicion.65
In Alasaad, the First Circuit interpreted the border search exception
to encompass routine searches of electronic devices without reasonable suspicion of contraband or evidence of contraband. The court’s reluctance to
yield to contemporary privacy concerns surrounding electronic devices allowed the court to ignore the need for a standard requiring reasonable suspicion. Rather than uphold the already weakened constitutional rights of marginalized individuals, the First Circuit advanced the potential for increased
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations at the United States border.
Shannah Colbert

history of cases involving racial profiling at border). Some courts do not allow the consideration
of race and ethnicity in light of certain circumstances, such as the demographics of a region. Smith
& Santamaria, supra note 5, at 57. For example, “[t]he Ninth Circuit clarified that an individual’s
apparent Hispanic appearance is not a relevant factor for purposes of the Fourth Amendment ‘in
regions heavily populated by Hispanics.’” Id. However, other courts do not consider the location
of a search but permit race and ethnicity as factors for finding reasonable suspicion to stop and
search individuals at the border. Id.
64
See Hatmaker, supra note 26 (detailing suit against border agents “emboldened” by Trump
administration’s travel and immigration policies); see also sources cited supra, note 36 (noting
instances where border agents failed to uphold agencies’ nondiscriminatory policies).
65
See Rickerd, supra note 36 (indicating racial profiling will continue to occur at border);
Davidson, supra note 37 (“[d]espite the policy, the border Patrol nationally suffers ‘a persistent
culture of racism’”); see also Handeyside et al., supra note 35 (“CBP and ICE are asserting nearunfettered authority to search and seize travelers’ devices at the border, for purposes far afield from
the enforcement of immigration and customs laws.”)

